Security statement

Security statement — Seats Reclaim for Jira

Last updated: 25 September 2026 · App version 6.0.0

Architecture, in one line

Seats Reclaim is a native Atlassian Forge app. All code runs on Atlassian’s infrastructure. There is no vendor-hosted server, no database, no queue, no external API.

Egress: none

manifest.yml contains no permissions.external.fetch block. The Forge platform blocks any outbound request an app has not declared, so the app is structurally unable to send data outside Atlassian. This is not a policy we promise to follow; it is a capability we do not have.

Consequence for your risk register: the entire class of “the vendor was breached / the vendor mishandled our data” incidents cannot apply, because the vendor never holds the data.

Authentication: yours, not ours

Every Jira API call is made with asUser() — the identity of the administrator who has the page open. The app therefore can do nothing that the person using it could not already do by hand; requires no API token, service account or credential of any kind; and leaves an audit trail in Jira attributed to a real person, not to a robot.

We deliberately do not use the app’s own identity (asApp()) for any write in the product itself. The Diagnostics tab contains one probe that compares both identities on a remove-and-restore, and that probe, like every other write, is refused unless the caller is a Jira administrator — see below.

Permissions requested, and the call that needs each

There is one write capability in the whole app, and its inverse is the undo button.

Blast radius, stated plainly

The worst thing a bug in Seats Reclaim could do is remove people from a Jira group they should have stayed in. It cannot delete accounts, delete issues, change issue data, change permissions, or read issue content — it does not hold the permissions to do any of those.

That damage is reversible in one click, and the information needed to reverse it is written to the log before the operation continues.

Safety controls in the product

Data handled

Account ids, display names, e-mail addresses as returned by Jira, group membership, and activity timestamps, read at the time of use. Issue content is never requested. Only the operation log is persisted, in Forge storage, deletable from the interface at any time — and it holds account ids only, never names or e-mail addresses. Field-by-field detail in the privacy policy.

See also

The privacy policy and the support page.

Vulnerability handling

Report to support@pieranlab.cloud. We aim to acknowledge within 3 working days. Because the app has no server, remediation always means publishing a new app version through the Marketplace.

Dependencies

Only Atlassian’s own Forge packages (@forge/api, @forge/bridge, @forge/kvs, @forge/react, @forge/resolver) and React. No other runtime dependency, so no third-party supply chain beyond Atlassian’s own.

Verification

Change log of this statement