Security statement — Seats Reclaim for Jira
Last updated: 25 September 2026 · App version 6.0.0
Architecture, in one line
Seats Reclaim is a native Atlassian Forge app. All code runs on Atlassian’s infrastructure. There is no vendor-hosted server, no database, no queue, no external API.
Egress: none
manifest.yml contains no permissions.external.fetch block. The Forge platform blocks any outbound request an app has not declared, so the app is structurally unable to send data outside Atlassian. This is not a policy we promise to follow; it is a capability we do not have.
Consequence for your risk register: the entire class of “the vendor was breached / the vendor mishandled our data” incidents cannot apply, because the vendor never holds the data.
Authentication: yours, not ours
Every Jira API call is made with asUser() — the identity of the administrator who has the page open. The app therefore can do nothing that the person using it could not already do by hand; requires no API token, service account or credential of any kind; and leaves an audit trail in Jira attributed to a real person, not to a robot.
We deliberately do not use the app’s own identity (asApp()) for any write in the product itself. The Diagnostics tab contains one probe that compares both identities on a remove-and-restore, and that probe, like every other write, is refused unless the caller is a Jira administrator — see below.
Permissions requested, and the call that needs each
read:user:jira,read:jira-user— list the members of a group.read:group:jira— list groups, and read which groups a person belongs to.read:avatar:jira— required by the same endpoints as above.read:application-role:jira— know which groups grant which paid product, and how many users are billed.read:issue-details:jira,read:jira-work— run the activity queries (timestamps only).read:field:jira— discover which JQL fields exist on your site instead of assuming.read:permission:jira— check whether a person is a Jira administrator, so they are never removed.read:license:jira— tell a free site from a paid one.write:group:jira— the only write: remove or re-add a person to a group.storage:app— the operation log, in Forge storage on your installation (account ids only).
There is one write capability in the whole app, and its inverse is the undo button.
Blast radius, stated plainly
The worst thing a bug in Seats Reclaim could do is remove people from a Jira group they should have stayed in. It cannot delete accounts, delete issues, change issue data, change permissions, or read issue content — it does not hold the permissions to do any of those.
That damage is reversible in one click, and the information needed to reverse it is written to the log before the operation continues.
Safety controls in the product
- The caller must be a Jira administrator. Every resolver that can change anything — start, execute, undo, clear the log, and the diagnostic write probe — asks Jira whether the person invoking it holds the global
ADMINISTERpermission, and refuses otherwise. The check fails closed: if the answer cannot be obtained, the answer is no. It is applied in one place that all resolvers pass through, so it cannot be forgotten in one of them. - Mandatory preview. Nothing is written until a human has seen the list of names.
- Every person is accounted for. The preview refuses to run if “will be removed” plus “will not be touched” does not equal the size of the group.
- A failed measurement never removes anyone. Activity has three outcomes — active, inactive, not measured — and only inactive is actionable.
- Batching with a hard stop at the first error. Never all-or-nothing; the log records how many people were never even attempted.
- Independent re-verification at write time. Immediately before each removal the app re-checks, server-side, that the person is still not an administrator and still has no unresolved issues assigned. The client’s preview is not trusted.
- A floor on the inactivity window. Below 30 days the app refuses to run.
- Protected by default: app and integration accounts, administrators, site and org admin groups, the person running it, anyone with open work, and anyone who would keep the same product from another group.
Data handled
Account ids, display names, e-mail addresses as returned by Jira, group membership, and activity timestamps, read at the time of use. Issue content is never requested. Only the operation log is persisted, in Forge storage, deletable from the interface at any time — and it holds account ids only, never names or e-mail addresses. Field-by-field detail in the privacy policy.
See also
The privacy policy and the support page.
Vulnerability handling
Report to support@pieranlab.cloud. We aim to acknowledge within 3 working days. Because the app has no server, remediation always means publishing a new app version through the Marketplace.
Dependencies
Only Atlassian’s own Forge packages (@forge/api, @forge/bridge, @forge/kvs, @forge/react, @forge/resolver) and React. No other runtime dependency, so no third-party supply chain beyond Atlassian’s own.
Verification
- 157 automated tests, run before every deploy. They do not only cover the decision logic: since 27 August 2026 the real resolvers run against an in-memory Jira, which is what found seven defects no synthetic test could see.
- Every safeguard is checked with a mutation proof: switched off one at a time, each must turn at least one test red. A safeguard that breaks nothing when removed was not protecting anything.
forge lintclean.- Full round-trip verified on a live Jira Cloud site, most recently on 27 August 2026 on the hardened build: preview → removal → the instance’s billed-user count dropped by one → undo → the count returned. That counter is Atlassian’s own, which is what makes it a proof rather than a claim.
Change log of this statement
- 6.0.0 (25 September 2026) — the operation log no longer stores display names. It keeps Atlassian account ids only, and the History tab reads the names from Jira each time it opens (
GET /rest/api/3/user/bulk, with the read scopes the app already had — no new permission). Logs written by earlier versions are cleaned the first time they are opened. The app therefore stores no personal data. Proved by a test that runs a full removal, skip and undo, then reads everything in storage and finds no name and no e-mail address — and fails when the cleaning is switched off. - 5.0.0 (7 September 2026) — added the administrator check on the caller. Until this version, a resolver that changes group membership did not verify that the person invoking it was a Jira administrator. Most writes run as the calling user, so Jira itself refused them; the exceptions were the diagnostic write probe, which uses the app identity, and clearing the operation log. Found while answering question 3 of Atlassian’s Forge security questionnaire, and proved by switching the new check off and watching three write resolvers succeed for a non-administrator.
- 4.0.0 (26 August 2026) — first published version.