Security statement — OpenAPI Viewer & Macro Migrator for Confluence
Last updated: 22 October 2026
Architecture, in one line
The app is an Atlassian Forge app. All of its code runs on Atlassian’s infrastructure. There is no vendor-hosted server, no database and no analytics.
Egress, and why it is open
The app declares permissions.external.fetch with *, both for its server-side function and for the browser. We state this plainly because it is the first thing a security review looks for.
- Server side: to read a specification from the https address configured in a macro. Specifications live wherever your teams publish them — a repository, an API gateway, an internal portal — and that cannot be known in advance.
- Browser: so that Try it out can send the requests a user makes to the API the specification describes. Without it, the platform blocks the request.
What the app contacts in practice: the address configured in each macro, and the API a user calls with Try it out. Nothing is sent to us. Only https is possible: the Forge runtime refuses plain http.
Credentials for private repositories
- Stored in Forge storage as encrypted secrets (
kvs.setSecret), never in the page and never returned to the browser: the configuration screen only learns whether a credential is saved, and for which address. - Bound to one origin. Each credential is saved with the scheme, host and port it was entered for, and the server sends it only to that origin. A request to any other address — including a look-alike host such as
example.com.attacker.net— goes out without it. - The macro is identified by Atlassian, not by the browser. Which macro is asking, and which address it is configured with, are read from the context Forge provides, never from the request payload — so a person who can view a page cannot make the app send another macro’s credential to an address of their choice.
- Removable at any time from the macro configuration.
Specifications attached to a page
When a macro shows a specification attached to its page, the app reads the attachment with its own identity, so that people reading the page are not asked to grant the app access. Before it does, it asks Confluence whether the person viewing the page can read that page, and refuses otherwise, anonymous viewers included. The page is the one Forge reports the macro is rendered on, never one named in the request. This check was added in version 3.0.0 (22 October 2026).
The migration page
- It is a Confluence global settings page: only Confluence administrators can open it. To other users it does not exist (tested with a non-administrator account on 13 October 2026).
- Its operations are accepted only when they come from that page. A macro on an ordinary page cannot call them.
- Every read and write runs as the administrator (
asUser), never with the app’s own identity. If the administrator cannot edit a page, the conversion stops and nothing changes (tested on 13 October 2026 with an edit restriction). - Each conversion is a normal page version: the previous version stays in the page history and can be restored by anyone allowed to.
Permissions requested, and why
read:page:confluence— read the body of the pages the migration page previews and converts.write:page:confluence— save the converted page (always as the administrator).read:attachment:confluence— read a specification attached to the page that shows it.read:content.permission:confluence— ask Confluence whether the person viewing that page can read it, before the attachment is read for them.search:confluence— find the pages that still use the retiring macros.storage:app— keep repository credentials server-side.
Data handled
Specifications, macro configuration, and — on the migration page — the body of the pages being converted, processed in memory inside the Forge runtime. The only data stored is repository credentials, as described above. No personal data is stored. When reading a specification fails, the app logs the host and the HTTP status code, never the path, query, credentials or content. Details in the privacy policy.
Content in the page
Swagger UI is bundled with the app and served by Atlassian. Nothing is loaded from a third-party CDN. Styles are shipped as files, compatible with the Content Security Policy Forge applies to app pages.
Vulnerability handling
Report to support@pieranlab.cloud. We aim to acknowledge within 3 working days. Because the app has no server of ours, remediation always means publishing a new app version through the Marketplace.
Dependencies
Atlassian’s Forge packages (@forge/api, @forge/bridge, @forge/kvs, @forge/resolver), React, swagger-ui-react to render specifications, and js-yaml to read YAML.
Verification
- 31 automated tests run before every deploy, covering the conversion of every supported legacy macro, the credential guards, the parsing of OpenAPI 2.0, 3.0 and 3.1, and the error messages. The converter is checked against the exact format Confluence itself writes, captured from a live site.
- The security guards (migration only from its page, credentials only to their own origin, the macro identified by Atlassian’s context, https only, permission errors reported as such) and the converter’s format checks were each switched off one at a time: every change turned the test that names it red (13 October 2026). A safeguard that breaks nothing when removed is not protecting anything.
- The viewer permission check on attachments was tested the same way on 22 October 2026: switched off, its test turns red; forced to refuse on a live site, the attachment is no longer read and the macro says why.
- Verified on a live Confluence Cloud site on 12–13 October 2026: all six legacy macro types converted and rendered, credentials reaching only their own address, Try it out answering, and the two permission tests above.
See also
The privacy policy and the support page.